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COMMENTS
Educational Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and
the Supreme Colll't
Recently, state systems of financing public education have been
overturned or seriously threatened by several state and federal court
cases1 based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, 2 which
invalidated the Texas system of educational financing, will be argued
before the Supreme Court next term. This Comment will examine
the doctrinal3 and policy problems that the Court will confront and
the alternative solutions that are available to the Court when it con1. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex.
1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972): Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,
334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct,
Maricopa County, Ariz., Jan. 13, 1972); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241,
96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971): Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972);
Sweetwater County Planning Comm. for the Organization of School Dists. v. Hinkle,
491 P .2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
2. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S.
June 7, 1972).
3. Over the decade, a substantial quantity of legal commentary has been addressed
to the issue of the constitutionality of educational financing systems. This literature
includes J. COONS, w. CLUNE&: s. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND Punuc EDUCATION
(1970) [hereinafter PRlvATE WEALTH AND Punuc EDuCAnoN), portions of which were
published in Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State
Financial Structures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305 (1969) [hereinafter Educational Opportunity];
A. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS: THE PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPOR•
TUNITY (1968); Coons, Clune&: Sugarman, A First Appraisal of Serrano, 2 YALE REV. L,
&: Soc. ACT. 111 (1971) [hereinafter First Appraisal]; Dimond, Serrano: A Victory of
Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education, id. at 133 (1971); Goldstein, Interdistrict

Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its
Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504 (1972): Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The
Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in Public School Education, 13 UCLA L. REV.
1147 (1966); Horowitz &: Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public
Education and Public Assistance Programs from Place to Place Within a State, 15
UCLA L. REv. 787 (1968); Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and
opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CAuF. L, REv. 720
(1972); Kirp, The Poor, the Schools and Equal Protection, 38 HARV. EDuc. REv. 635
(1968); Kirp &: Yudof, Serrano in the Political Arena, 2 YALE REv. L. &: Soc, ACT. 143
(1971) [hereinafter Kirp &: Yudof]; Kurland, Equal Educational opportunity: The
Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 583 (1968);
Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment,
83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public Education,
71 CoLUM. L. REv. 1355 (1971); Shanks, Educational Financing and Equal Protection:
Will the California Supreme Court's Breakthrough Become the Law of the Land?, I J.
LAw &: Enuc. 73 (1972): Silard &: White, Intrastate Inequalities in Public Educa•
tion: The Case for Judicial Relief Under the Equal Protection Clause, 1970 WIS, L.
REv. 7; Wise, School Finance Equalization Lawsuits: A Model Legislative Response, 2
YALE REv. L. &: Soc. ACT. 123 (1971) [hereinafter School Finance]; Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection: Education, Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HARV. C1v,
RIGHTS·Clv. Lm. L. REv. 103 (1972) [hereinafter Comment); Kirp &: Yudof, Book Review,
6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 617 (1971) [hereinafter Kirp &: Yudof, Book
Review].
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siders the constitutionality of the Texas system, which is typical of
the educational financing programs that have generated so much
recent litigation.
Currently, most states finance public education primarily
through taxes assessed on real property ·within each individual school
district.4 State governments usually provide some aid to school districts in the form of flat, per pupil grants or equalization grants to
ensure that each district expends a certain minimum amount per
pupil." Nevertheless, large discrepancies among districts in revenueraising capacity continue to exist due to differences in taxable property values. A wealthy district may raise more revenue than a poorer
district while taxing itself at a lower rate. 6 Furthermore, many states
4. K.irp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 143.
5. The following brief summary of the most widely used methods of state aid to
local school districts is based on PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3,
at 63-197, and Educational Opportunity, supra note 3, at 312-17.
The most elementary system for providing state aid is the flat grant. Under this
plan each district receives a specified number of dollars per pupil. This method will
generally neither reduce nor widen the gap in per pupil expenditures between
richer and poorer districts since the per pupil expenditures in each are increased by
the same amount. Therefore, full equality will never be achieved simply through fl.at
grants. If the grants are made on the basis of units other than pupils, such as classrooms or teachers, then the gap between districts would be widened since the
wealthier districts are capable of providing more of such units.
A second method is known as the foundation plan. Under this system, the local
district agrees to tax at a certain minimum rate. The state then provides an amount
of money necessary to bring each district up to a specified minimum level of expenditures per pupil or other unit. Although the foundation plan may decrease the
gap between districts, it will not eliminate it since the wealthier districts are capable
of financing expenditures far in excess of the minimum level.
A number of states have combined the fl.at grant and the foundation plan. Under
one such method, the state determines the foundation amount by subtracting the
amount raised by a district through its own effort from a guaranteed minimum
amount. This foundation grant is then added to a fl.at grant to determine the total
state aid. Another combination plan is used in Illinois, California, and Minnesota,
where three of the most important cases challenging educational financing have arisen.
Under this plan, the amount raised locally at the specified tax rate is first added to
the fl.at grant. The sum is then subtracted from the guaranteed minimum level per
pupil. The district then receives the difference plus the fl.at grant. As a result, if a
district is so poor that the difference between the amount it raises by itself and the
guaranteed minimum level exceeds the amount of the fl.at grant, then the district will
in effect receive no fl.at grant at all since the amount of the flat grant has actually
been subtracted from the guaranteed level along with the amount raised locally. On
the other hand, if a district is too wealthy to receive any aid under the foundation
plan, it still receives the fl.at grant. This particular formula produces a wider gap
between the wealthier and poorer districts than would have existed under a simple
foundation or the first combination plan.
A method which at least has the potential for achieving equality among districts
is the percentage equalizing plan. Under this system, the local district sets its own
budget. The state grant is based upon the relative wealth (in terms of taxable
property) of each district in relation to the wealthiest district in the state. Each district
is required to finance locally the remainder of its budget in order to receive the full
state grant. In practice, however, the states employing this method have destroyed its
potential for equalization through modifications.
6. If district A contained $100,000 worth of taxable property for each student
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place a maximum ceiling on the rate at which a district may tax
itself.7 As a result, poorer districts are often prohibited from raising
as much revenue as wealthier districts even if they are willing to
suffer a steeper tax rate. Thus the amount of financial resources
devoted to a child's education is largely dependent upon the taxable
wealth of the district in which he lives. 8 These inequities have often
been criticized and are currently the subject of constitutional litigation.

I.

HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LmGATION
INVOLVING EDUCATIONAL FINANCING

Judicial scrutiny of inequalities in public education began with
Brown v. Board of Education. 9 Initially, the courts focused almost
exclusively on inequalities created by racial discrimination. However, in 1968, the Illinois educational financing system was challenged as being in violation of the equal protection clause in Mclnnis
v. Shapiro. 10 The public schools of Illinois were administered by local
school districts. As is typically the case, the bulk of revenue for
operating schools was raised by ad valorem taxes on property within
each individual district. 11 The state supplemented the local revenue
by providing a flat, per pupil grant and an equalization grant. The
latter consisted of the difference between the sum of the amount per
pupil raised within a district plus the flat grant and a 400 dollar
foundation level prescribed by the state.12 Consequently, 1,000
dollars was available to each student in the richest school district in
Illinois as opposed to 480 dollars per pupil in the poorest school
enrolled in its public schools, while district B contained only $10,000 worth of property
for each student, district A could tax itself at 1% and still raise $1000 per pupil, while
district B could only raise $500 per pupil by taxing itself at 5%.
7. For example, the Florida legislature enacted a "Millage Rollback Act" providing
that any district that taxed itself at a rate in excess of ten mills ad valorem was
ineligible for state aid. This legislation was declared unconstitutional by a three-judge
district court in Hargrave v. Kirk, 313 F. Supp. 944 (M.D. Fla. 1970), which the Supreme
Court vacated and remanded in Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971), with an order
to abstain while an action challenging the legislation in the state court proceeded.
8. In California the elementary-school district with the highest per pupil expenditure at the time of the Serrano decision spent $2586 per pupil while the lowest spent
only $407. Legislative Analyst, Public School Finance, pt. 5, at 7, cited in Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 594, 487 P.2d 1241, 1247, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 607. More astounding
still is the reported differential in Texas where the wealthiest district spent $5834 per
pupil while the poorest spent $264. Stevens, U.S. Court Upsets Texas School Tax Tied
to Property, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1971, at I, col. I; at 15, col. 4 [hereinafter Stevens].
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
IO. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd. mem. sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 894
U.S. 322 (1969). The complaint challenged ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122 §§ 11-1, 11-6, 11-9,
18-1 to -4, 18-8 to -14, 29-5, 34-22 to -29, 34-42 to -82. 327 F. Supp. at 829 n.2.
11. 293 F. Supp. at 330.
12. 293 F. Supp. at 330. See note 5 supra for a more complete explanation of this
plan.
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district.13 A three-judge federal district court held that the Illinois
financing system did not deny the complaining students equal protection of the laws. 14 Alternatively, the court concluded that there
were no judicially manageable standards for apportioning educational resources on the basis of the individual student's educational
needs.15
The first constitutional challenge to a state educational financing
system ended abruptly when the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
the decision in Mclnnis. 16 A year later in Burrus v. Wilkerson 17 the
Court summarily affirmed the judgment of a three-judge decision
that had relied heavily on Mclnnis to support its holding that the
Virginia school financing system did not violate equal protection.
The Court's summary disposition of Mclnnis and Burrus might be
interpreted as foreclosing constitutional challenges to educational
financing systems. However, the uncertain status of Mclnnis as precedent is demonstrated by the current wave of educational financing
litigation that has developed despite Mclnnis.
In the leading case of Serrano v. Priest,18 the California supreme
court concluded that Mclnnis did not preclude further constitutional
scrutiny of the state's educational financing system.19 The court acknowledged that a summary affirmance by the United States Supreme
Court of the judgment of a three-judge district court is technically an
adjudication on the merits. But it noted that such an affirmance, like a
denial of certiorari, may merely indicate an attempt to relieve docket
pressures.20 The court further observed that the Supreme Court has
sometimes decided a case on grounds contrary to the implications of
a summary affirmance of a judgment.21 The California court emphasized that the Supreme Court apparently does not consider the
educational financing issue closed since in Askew v. Hargrave 22 the
Court remanded a challenge to the Florida school financing system
to the district court ordering abstention pending a state court pro13. 293 F. Supp. at 330.
14. 293 F. Supp. at 332.
15. 293 F. Supp. at 335.
16. 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
17. 397 U.S. 44 {1970), afjg. mem. 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969).
18. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P .2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
19. 5 Cal. 3d at 615-18, 487 P.2d at 1263-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623-25. In distinguishing
Mcinnis (and at other points in the opinion), the court relied on Educational opportunity, supra note 3, at 308-09, a condensation of PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EouCATION, supra note 3, at 311-15.
20. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624, citing Frankfurter &:
Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HAP.v. L. REv.
1, 14 {1930).
21. 5 Cal. 3d at 616 n.35, 487 P.2d at 1264 n.35, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 n.35.
22, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
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ceeding and then a further hearing on the merits. 23 The Supreme
Court may have summarily affirmed in Mclnnis because the issues
were not clearly defined.24 The California court also argued that the
disposition in Mclnnis rested primarily on the nonjusticiability of
the plaintiffs' prayer for equalized fulfillment of students' educational needs, and thus a complaint proposing a different standard
for relief is not foreclosed. 25 Finally, the California court reasoned
that the Supreme Court seldom makes a final disposition of an important and complex question like educational financing without
oral arguments or a written opinion.26 For these reasons, the court
concluded that the constitutionality of educational financing systems
similar to the one involved in Mclnnis is still an open question.27
Despite the arguments raised in Serrano, the Supreme Court may
have intended Mclnnis to be dispositive of the constitutional question since the affirmance was a decision on the merits. To allocate
judicial resources efficiently, the Court must decide matters of importance in summary opinions. Furthermore, 1.W:clnnis has not been
totally ignored by state and federal courts. The recent New York
case Spano v. Board of Education,28 which dismissed a challenge to
that state's educational :financing system, relied on Mclnnis and
Burrus.29 The New York court observed that briefs were submitted
to the Supreme Court in Mclnnis by the same counsel involved in
Serrano and inferred that the Court was fully acquainted with the
nature of the issues at stake.30 After considering the Serrano attempt
to distinguish Mclnnis, the court concluded that it should not speculate on the binding effect of recent Supreme Court decisions. 31
Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine what Mclnnis stands for. If
the Supreme Court intends that Mclnnis be interpreted to foreclose
constitutional challenges to property tax financing of school systems,
it will be necessary for the Court to review another educational
financing case in order to lay the issue to rest.
Once past the barrier of Mclnnis, litigation challenging educa23. 5 Cal. 3d at 617 n.37, 487 P.2d at 1265 n.37, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625 n.37. The
Supreme Court's remand in Hargrave may not mean that the Court considers the
constitutionality of school financing by local property ta.xes an open issue. The
complaint in Hargrave challenged the "Millage Rollback Act," which specified a
maximum tax rate for school districts, rather than the school financing system as a
whole. See note 7 supra.
24. 5 Cal. 3d at 617 n.37, 487 P.2d at 1265 n.37, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625 n.37.
25. 5 Cal. 3d at 617, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The court in Rodrig11ez
relied primarily upon this ground for distinguishing Mclnnis. 337 F. Supp. 280, 283-84.
26. 5 Cal. 3d at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1264-65, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
27. 5 Cal. 3d at 618, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625.
28. - Misc. 2d -, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
29. - Misc. 2d at-, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
30. - Misc. 2d at-, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
31. - Misc. 2d at -, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 232-33.
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tional financing systems proved surprisingly successful. Serrano was
the watershed decision. The plaintiffs brought a. class action on
behalf of all the public school children and their parents in California except those living in the school district that provided the
greatest educational opportunity.32 They alleged that the California
school financing system, which relied primarily on local property
ta.--ces, violated the equal protection clause since it required the parents of children in relatively poor school districts to "pay a higher
tax rate to obtain the same or lesser educational opportunities than
those afforded to children in other districts." 33 The California system
of educational financing did not vary significantly from the Illinois
program challenged in Mclnnis. 34 Nevertheless, the California supreme court held that the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action
under the equal protection clause35 and remanded the case to the
lower court for trial, reversing the court of appeals' order36 that had
sustained a demurrer on the basis of Mclnnis.
Subsequently, in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 37 a federal district
court denied a motion to dismiss a complaint that challenged on
equal protection grounds the educational financing system of Minnesota. In Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, a
three-judge federal district court in Texas became the first court to
hold that a state system38 of educational financing was unconstitu32. 5 Cal. 3d at 589, 487 P .2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
33. 5 Cal. 3d at 589-91, 487 P.2d at 1244-45, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604-05. The plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the system was unconstitutional and a court-ordered reallocation of funds. The suit was brought against "state and county officials charged
with administering the financing system," including the state treasurer.
34. 5 Cal. 3d at 592-95, 487 P.2d at 1246-47, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 606-08. See CAL. Eouc.
CODE §§ 17300, 17651-80, 17702, 17751, 17901-02, 20501-1255 (West Supp. 1972).
35. 5 Cal. 3d at 618-19, 487 P .2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
On motion to dismiss, the California supreme court assumed that there is a causal
relationship between educational expenditures and educational quality. 5 Cal. 3d at
601 n.16, 487 P .2d at 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613 n.16. The plaintiffs must establish
through the use of e.'{pert testimony at trial that such a relationship 'exists. Available
data suggest that this might well be difficult. See notes 192-95 infra and accompanying
text. But see Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 246-57, 287 A.2d 187, 199-205
(1972). The court concluded on the basis of expert testimony that there is at least some
correlation beaveen educational expenditures and educational quality. The court
conceded, however, that there was not a great deal of persuasive data available. See
notes 191-97 infra and accompanying text. Plaintiffs in Serrano must also provide the
trial court with a standard for relief if they prevail on the merits.
Although Serrano is a landmark decision, it will probably never be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Rodriguez, which will be argued next term, is the likely vehicle of the
Court's view. Also, the Supreme Court may lack jurisdiction over an appeal since the
California court also based its decision on the California constitution. 5 Cal. 3d at
596 n.11, 487 P .2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11. This raises the substantial
possibility that an adequate state ground for the decision exists. See Karst, supra note
3, at 743-48.
36. Serrano v. Priest, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal. App. 1970).
37. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
38. The methods used to finance public education in Texas are not materially
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tional under the fourteenth amendment. Since then, a state trial court
in New Jersey relied on both the federal and state constitutions to invalidate that state's financing scheme.39 In addition, courts in Arizona40 and Wyoming41 have followed the precedent set by Serrano.
Currently, lawsuits challenging educational financing systems under
the equal protection clause are pending in courts across the nation.4?
A constitutional question that apparently had suffered a premature
death has been revived as a controversial legal issue.
II.

A.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION ISSUE

Standards of Judicial Scrutiny of Legislation Under
the Fourteenth Amendment

Most of the pending challenges to state systems of educational
financing are based on the argument that these systems violate the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme
Court has employed two different standards for reviewing legislation
under the equal protection clause.43 In ordinary cases, including
those involving business regulation statutes, the Court has employed
a standard of restrained review, sometimes referred to as traditional
equal protection. When it applies this standard, the Court only inquires whether there is a rational relationship between the classification established by the statute under scrutiny and a legitimate state
different from the methods employed in California or Illinois. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
arts. 16.71-.78, 20.01 (1969); TEX. CONST. art. 7 §§ 3, 3a. The state provides a
minimum amount of expenditures per pupil to the local districts through a Minimum
Foundation Program. Additional state aid is apportioned from the state's Available
School Fund. The local districts must pay off bonded indebtedness for capital expenditures, fund all expenditures above the minimum level, and provide their share
of the Minimum Foundation Program through taxes on local property. 337 F. Supp.
at 281. The district court focused on inequalities in per pupil expenditures as well as
inequalities in tax rates betlveen poorer and wealthier districts. On the basis of expert
testimony, the court found that the methods of providing state aid subsidized the
wealthier districts at the expense of the poorer ones instead of equalizing expenditures. 337 F. Supp. at 282. The court accepted the Serrano rationale that education is a
fundamental interest and wealth is a suspect classification. 337 F. Supp. at 282-83. The
court concluded that there was no compelling state interest capable of justifying the
Texas school financing system. 337 F. Supp. at 284.
39. Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972).
40. Hollins v. Shofstall, No. C-253652 (Super. Ct. Maricopa County, Ariz,, Jan. 13,
1972).
41. Sweetlll'ater County Planning Comm. for the Organization of School Dlsts. v.
Hinkle, 491 P .2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971).
42. Suits have been filed in Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, and Wisconsin. See Comment, supra note 3, at 200-13 for a description
of the litigation.
43. See generally Deuelopments in the Law-oEqual Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv.
1065, 1077-1131 (1969).
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objective.44 While the scope of this inquiry is uncertain, the legislation in controversy clearly bears a presumption of validity.45
However, when a classification affects certain "fundamental interests" or is "inherently suspect," the Court applies a much stricter
standard of review.46 Under this standard, the state must first demonstrate that its statutory classification is necessary for the achievement
of a "compelling state interest."47 In addition, it must show that the
classification is precisely tailored to further the purpose it is designed
to accomplish.48 Finally, the state must prove that there is no less
onerous alternative by which its objective may be achieved.49 To
date, the Court has recognized voting,50 fair criminal procedure,61
interstate travel, 52 and procreation53 as "fundamental interests" that
deserve special protection under the fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, it has declared that classifications based on race, 54 ancestty,65 or alienage56 are "inherently suspect" and thus subject to
scrutiny under the strict standard.
B.

Should Current Educational Financing Systems Be
Subjected to Strict Scrutiny?

I. The Serrano Rationale
The strict standard of review was first applied in educational
:financing litigation by the California supreme court in Serrano v.
Priest. The court based its decision on its recognition of education
as a fundamental interest57 and, alternatively, on the proposition that
discriminations based upon wealth are suspect classi:6.cations.68 The
44. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
45. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-80 (1911).
46. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
47. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
48. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
49. E.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
50. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
51. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
52. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
53. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
54. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
55. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
56. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
57. 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18. A thorough
analysis of the arguments that education is a fundamental interest can be found in
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 339-93, 409-19. See also Silard
8: White, supra note 3, at 16-20; Kirp, supra note 3, at 642-46; Horowitz, supra note 3,
at 1162.
58. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 587 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610. For an analysis of the
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court conceded that no authority had explicitly recognized education
as a fundamental interest.59 But it observed that education has an
impact on society and the individual comparable to that of voting
and fair criminal procedure, both of which had been previously recognized as fundamental interests. 60 In support of its position, the
court relied heavily on policy arguments advanced by the authors of
Private Wealth and Public Education, 61 Coons, Clune, and Sugarman,
who reasoned that education's role as a means of entry into the mainstream of American society, the universality of its effects, its continuity over a lengthy period of time, its role in molding the individual's personality, and the fact that it is made compulsory by state
law distinguish it as a fundamental interest.62
As authority for the alternative proposition that wealth is a suspect classification, the court cited Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,63 in which the United States Supreme Court invalidated a
Virginia poll tax under the equal protection clause; Griffin v. Illinois,64 in which the Court held that the state must provide an indigent with a transcript on appeal; and Douglas v. California, 0G in
which the Court held that the state must provide an indigent with
counsel on appeal. Language in these cases indicated that the Court
disfavored classifications based upon wealth. Concluding that wealth
classifications are inherently suspect, the court found that the California financing system discriminated on the basis of wealth since
the amount of revenue that a district could raise to support its schools
was largely dependent on the wealth of the district in terms of taxable property.66 The court observed that the discrimination was twosignificance of wealth as a suspect classification in the educational financing context,
see PRIVATE WEALTH AND PuBuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 359-76; Silard &: White,
supra note 3, at 19-20.
59. 5 Cal. 3d at 604, 487 P .2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. The court cited a
number of United States and California supreme court cases for their dicta describing
the extreme importance of education in society. Most of these cases dealt with racial
discrimination in education and therefore did not reach the question of whether
education is a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
60. 5 Cal. 3d at 602-08, 487 P.2d at 1257-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617-18, The court
noted that education affects even more people than the criminal process and contributes
to reduction of the crime rate as well. The court observed further that education
promotes more meaningful voting by providing citizens a better understanding of
public issues. For an extended comparison of the interests of criminal procedure and
voting with education, see PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at
363-73.
61. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3.
62. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
63. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
64. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
65. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
66. 5 Cal. 3d at 598-600, 487 P.2d at 1250-51, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11.
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fold since the wealthier districts could provide higher educational
expenditures with a lower tax rate. 67
On the basis of its finding-s that the California school financing
system established a classification that both affected a fundamental
interest and was inherently suspect, the court in Serrano subjected
the system to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. 68 The
court did not reach the question whether local control over financial
decision-making was a compelling state interest since it concluded
that the California system of financing public education did not
promote local control.69 Consequently, the court concluded that if
the plaintiffs could sustain the allegations of their complaint at trial,
the California method of financing public education would be declared unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection in violation
of the fourteenth amendment.70
The Serrano decision to apply the strict standard of review to
classifications affecting education and based upon wealth has been
followed by two federal district courts.71 Nevertheless, there is substantial question whether this decision is consistent with the trend
in recent Supreme Court equal protection cases. Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections and Shapiro v. Thompson72 suggested that the
Supreme Court was willing to extend the strict standard of review
into new areas. More recently, however, the Court apparently has
become concerned over the potentially expanded application of the
strict standard. As a result the Court may be unwilling to recognize
any new fundamental interests or suspect classifications or even to
adhere to the broader dicta in some of the cases concerning the application of the strict standard.
The Second Circuit recognized the Supreme Court's apparent
desire to restrict application of the strict equal protection standard
when it decided Johnson v. New York State Education Department.73 Although Johnson did not involve the issue of educational
67. The court noted that the foundation program only partially alleviated the
disparities created by variations in district wealth. It also declared that "the ratio of
resources to pupils" within a given district was the only significant index: of district
wealth. The court concluded that simply because a district could raise more money by
taxing itself at a higher rate did not alter the fact that the amount of money available
for education is dependent upon the wealth of the local property since many districts
were too poor to compete with the wealthier districts. 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P .2d at
1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
o
68. 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20.
69. 5 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. See notes 226 &
250 infra,
70. 5 Cal. 3d at 614-15, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
71. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. 1
Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 7, 1972); Van Dusartz v.
Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
72. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
73. 449 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
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financing, it did examine the question of which standard of review
is applicable to statutes that establish wealth classifications in the
area of public education. Section 701 of the New York Education
Laws required local school boards to provide textbooks for all children in grades seven through twelve who resided within the district
regardless of whether they attended public or private schools.74
Section 703 required that school boards also supply free textbooks
to children in grades one through six if the voters in the district authorized a tax for that purpose.75 The plaintiffs, who were mothers
of children enrolled in the New York State school system, filed suit
on behalf of themselves, their children, and other children similarly
situated. They alleged that the textbook statutes created an irrational classification between children in the upper grades and children in the lower grades and violated the equal protection clause by
imposing a requirement that those in the lower grades obtain voter
approval in order to receive free textbooks. 76 Plaintiffs also alleged
that they were deprived of equal educational opportunity because
they were too poor to pay the price or the rental fees for the textbooks and were forced to send their children to school without
texts. 77 Confronted with the question of which standard of review
to apply in reviewing the New York statutes, the court cited the recent Supreme Court case of Dandridge v. Williams78 for the proposition that "in the area of economics and social welfare, even where
such legislation involves 'basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings,' 'the Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts
no power to impose upon the State their views of what constitutes
wise economic or social policy.' " 79 Concluding that the traditional
standard was the appropriate standard of review, the court found
that given the finite amount of state resources, the classification
created by the textbook statutes was rationally related to the legislative purpose of encouraging the study of upper-grade subjects such as
science, mathematics, and foreign languages.80 The court then cited
James v. Valtierra 81 as foreclosing the plaintiffs' claims that an unfair
burden had been placed on the children in the lower grades to pro•
cure voter approval for funding of free texts.82
74. N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 701 (McKinney 1969).
75. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 703 (McKinney 1969). The state provided a~istancc of ten
dollars per pupil toward the purchase of texts.
76. 449 F .2d at 873.
77. 449 F.2d at 880.
78. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
79. 449 F.2d at 876-77, quoting 397 U.S. at 485, 486.
80. 449 F.2d at 876-78.
81. 402 U.S. 137 (1971). For a discu~ion of Yaltierra, sec notes 130-37 infra and
accompanying text.
82. 449 F.2d at 878.
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Finally, the appellate court turned its attention to the argument,
raised in an amicus brief, that once the state attempts to provide
public education it incurs a duty to provide free textbooks as well.83
After considering the applicability of some of the cases involving
fundamental interests as well as those suggesting that wealth might
be a suspect classification, the court dismissed this argument with
an allusion to Dandridge.84
While the New York textbook statutes arguably created a wealth
classification that affected access to public education, the Second Circuit in Johnson apparently felt that Dandridge precluded application
of the stricter standard of review. 85 On the other hand, the California
supreme court never mentioned Dandridge when it held in Serrano
that the state's school financing system created a classification that
warranted strict scrutiny. Clearly, judicial interpretation of Dandridge has a critical effect on the standard of equal protection review
applicable to discrimination in the area of education.

2. Does Dandridge Foreclose Recognition of Education
as a "Fundamental Interest''?
Dandridge involved a constitutional challenge to a Maryland
regulation enacted in connection with the state's participation in
the federal program of Aid to Dependent Children. The Court held
that the regulation, which placed a maximum limitation on the size
of the assistance payment a family was eligible to receive,86 did not
deny recipients with large families equal protection of the laws.
After determining that the strict standard was inapplicable, the
Court applied the traditional standard of review and found that the
regulation was rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of
"encouraging employment and avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the families of the working poor." 87 The Court
observed:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications
made by its laws are imperfect. . . .
83. 449 F.2d at 878-80. This argument is based on an analogy to Griffen v. Illinois
and Douglas v. California, in which the Court held that if a state provides an appellate
process, it must allow the indigent meaningful access to that process by providing him
with a free transcript and free counsel.
84. 449 F .2d at 879.
85. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kaufman expressed some of the same theories
that were relied upon in Serrano arguing that education is an area of fundamental
importance and that the state must demonstrate a compelling interest in order to
justify conditioning its exercise upon the payment of money. 449 F.2d at 881-82.
86. Due to the maximum grant limitation, large families would not be able to
receive the amount of assistance defined by the state as necessary to meet their needs.
397 U.S. at 474-75.
87. 397 U.S. at 486.

1336

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 70:1324

. . The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast
[with business regulation cases], involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically
real factual difference . . . but we can find no basis for applying a
different constitutional standard. . . . [T]he Fourteenth Amendment gives the federal courts no power to impose upon the States
their views of what constitutes ·wise economic or social policy.
• • . [T]he intractable economic, social and even philosophical
problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not
the business of this Court.ss

Read broadly, ·this language is ominous. It could suggest that the
strict standard of review is never applicable to classifications with
respect to social and economic welfare, including public assistance,
housing, education, and ordinary municipal services. 80
However, the holding in Dandridge was directed only at the
validity of the Maryland AFDC maximum grant regulation. Therefore, the foreboding language might be characterized as dicta and
need not be read as controlling the question of whether education
merits stricter judicial protection under the fourteenth amendment.
Alternatively, it might be argued that the language in Dandridge
was simply not intended to encompass education. Education is an
important and unique institution in society, and the Court may not
have intended to foreclose independent inquiry into whether it
is a fundamental interest.
Thus it appears that there are means by which those who seek to
promote education as a fundamental interest can circumvent the
language of Dandridge. Nevertheless, the rationale of the opinion
raises serious doubts about the recognition of education as a fundamental interest. The statement quoted above seemed to be specifically aimed at rejecting the contention that there is a fundamental
88. 397 U.S. at 485-87.
89. The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REv. 33, 60 (1970) [hereinafter
Supreme Court, 1969 Term]; Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1395.
Arguably, the foreboding language of Dandridge may have been aimed primarily
at limiting the increasing amount of "substantive" challenges to public assistance
legislation in the judicial branch. See Reinstein, Welfare Cases: Fundamental Rights,
tlze Poor and the Burden of Proof in Constitutional Legislation, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 21, 50
(1970). Only weeks earlier, however, the Court had sustained a significant "procedural"
challenge to "welfare" legislation in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The
Dandridge Court might have been less receptive to "substantive" challenges to public
assistance legislation, for fear of impeding the plans for totally restructuring the
welfare system which were under consideration in the legislative and executive
branches of government. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. at 677 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Reinstein, supra, at 50. However, the Court's invalidation of "substantive"
limitations on eligibility for public assistance under the equal protection clause in
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), and under the supremacy clause in
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), casts doubt on this theory.
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interest in subsistence,00 which suggests that the importance of an interest alone is not sufficient to warrant its characterization as fundamental.91
Assuming that the best possible case has been made for the importance of education in our society, it is questionable whether this
is sufficient to sustain the proposition that education is a fundamental interest given Dandridge's treatment of subsistence under the
equal protection clause. The Serrano rationale for giving education
exalted status appears to apply with equal force to subsistence benefits. 92 Subsistence benefits are at least as important to the individual
and society as education, even by the Serrano court's own terms. First,
Serrano suggested that education helps maintain "free enterprise
democracy" and is the bright hope of the underprivileged to gain
entry "into the mainstream of American society." 93 But nothing, including education, is more important to the poor than the means of
daily subsistence, which are often obtained only through public
assistance programs.94 Children who do not have enough to eat, nor
adequate housing or clothing cannot be expected to achieve their
academic potential even if they are afforded equal educational opportunity.95
Second, the Serrano court maintained that education, unlike
other municipal services, is universally relevant because it benefits
all members of society. The California supreme court noted that
while "'[r]elatively few are on welfare[,] [e]very person benefits
from education.' " 96 While education has a more universal effect
upon society than does the right of indigents to receive subsistence
benefits, there is certainly nothing more universal than the need of
90. Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare Adjudication,
58 CALIF. L. REv. 555, 598-600 (1970); Reinstein, supra note 89, at 44; Note, Equal
Protection-Cease Fire in the War on Poverty, 36 Mo. L. REv. 117, 124-26 (1971).
The decision to apply the strict standard of review in Shapiro was based on the
fact that the classification involved there affected the fundamental right to interstate
travel. Nevertheless, the Court's statement in Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627, that many
families depend on assistance benefits "to obtain the very means to subsist-food,
shelter, and other necessities of life" suggested to some commentators that the
recognition of a fundamental right to subsistence might be on the horizon. See
Michelman, supra note 3, at 40; Reinstein, supra, at 50. Such a conclusion finds additional support in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970).
91. See Dienes, supra note 90, at 598-600.
92. Goldstein, supra note 3, at 540-41.
93. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
94. Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REv. 591, 607 (1971).
95. H. BmcH &: J. Gussow, DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN: HEALTII, NUTRITION AND SCHOOL
FAILURE, Preface, at xi-xiii, 7, 265-67 (1970). See also Deutsch, The Disadvantaged
Child and the Leaming Process, in EDUCATION IN DEPRESSED AREAs 163 (A. Passow ed.
1963).
96. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619, quoting Educational
opportunity, supra note 3, at 388.
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all men to receive those basics that ensure their daily existence. 07 If
there are grounds for a distinction between education and subsistence
upon this point, it is not because the need for or effects of education
are more universal than subsistence, but merely because the state
plays a larger role in providing education than it does in providing
subsistence benefits.98 Third, the California court noted that, unlike
most other government services, education continues over a lengthy
period of time.99 Certainly welfare benefits are not designed to sustain their recipient indefinitely, but poverty is not a short-term
affair. It is conceivable that, as with education, the need for subsistence benefits might continue for an extended period of time.
Fourth, the Court stated that "education is unmatched in the
extent to which it molds the personality of the youth of society."100
It is arguable, however, that the provision of basic necessities such as
adequate food, clothing, and housing has an unparalleled effect on
the development of the child. In fact, denial of these essentials may
well frustrate efforts to educate the underprivileged.101 Unrelieved
poverty during the early years of a child's existence may leave a scar
on his psyche for the rest of his life.102 Finally, Serrano argued that
"education is so important that the state has made it compulsory." 108
Subsistence is so important, however, that it is unnecessary for the
state to make it compulsory.104
The Serrano court, noting that the Supreme Court has characterized the fundamental right of voting as preservative of other rights,1011
implied that education is also a preservative right in the sense that it
ensures intelligent political participation in the process that is• protected by the right to vote.106 But the necessities secured by welfare
benefits are preservative of life itself or at least of life at the mini97. Brest, supra note 94, at 608.
98. Many more individuals depend on the state for the provision of education than
for the provision of subsistence benefits. Yet it would be ironic to grant extra judicial
protection to one area of fundamental importance because so many people are affected
and deny extra judicial protection to another area equally important to the individual
because fewer people are affected. Where many people might be adversely affected, there
is at least some potential for eradicating the problem through the political process, But
in an area such as subsistence payments, the minority whose rights are affected would
have little hope of influencing reform through normal political channels,
99. 5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
100. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619,
101. See authorities cited in note 95 supra.
102. Id.
103. 5 Cal. 3d at 610, 487 P .2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619. See Horowitz, supra
note 3, at 1170.
104. See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 538-40.
105. 5 Cal. 3d at 608-09, 487 P .2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618, citing Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
106. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 371-72. Cf. First
Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114.
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mum standard that society considers acceptable. Given the Court's
refusal to characterize subsistence as a fundamental interest and the
difficulty in distinguishing education from subsistence, it is unlikely
that the Court will find a place in the fundamental interest category
for education.
Reliance upon Dandridge and the lack of a distinction between
education and subsistence apparently convinced the Second Circuit
in Johnson not to apply the strict standard of review to New York's
textbook statute. As the court pointed out: "[A]lthough education is
no doubt an area of fundamental importance, the Supreme Court
has made clear its view that in the area of social welfare, the 'compelling state interest' theory does not apply even though basic needs
may be involved." 107 The court continued in a footnote, "Certainly,
no one would contend that a student's need for textbooks is any more
fundamental than such items as food and clothing which are provided through welfare grants." 10s
Supreme Court decisions after Dandridge emphasize that the
Court intends to restrict its recognition of new fundamental interests. In Lindsey v. Normet, 109 the Court held that a statute that
required tenants who sought to appeal from an adverse judgment in
a forceable-entry suit to post a bond for double the amount of rent
due violated the equal protection clause by discouraging the right
to appeal. In reaching its decision, however, the Court rejected the
contention that " 'the need for decent shelter' " or " 'the right to
retain peaceful possession of one's home' " are fundamental interests
and.declared, "We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe
and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill."110 Like the right to subsistence, the right to housing compares favorably in importance with
education. Thus the California supreme court's rationale for recognizing education as a fundamental interest is not consistent with current equal protection doctrine, represented by Dandridge and Lindsey.
While it is clear that the importance of an interest does not of
necessity make it fundamental, the Supreme Court has never firmly
defined the characteristics of a "fundamental interest" under the
equal protection clause.111 However, Dandridge suggested a criterion
107. 449 F .2d at 879.
108. 449 F .2d at 879 n.11.
109. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
110. 405 U.S. at 74. The rejection of a fundamental right to housing was foreshadowed by the Court's failure to consider this contention in Valtierra. See The
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 40, 130 (1971) [hereinafter Supreme
Court, 1970 Term].
111. See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 HARv. L. R.Ev. 91, 91-95 (1966). For a discussion of some of the factors that
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that the Court may consider significant in the future. In a footnote,
the Court suggested that the "constitutionally protected" nature of
the right involved in Shapiro v. Thompson may have been the controlling factor in the decision to apply the strict standard of review
in that case.112 In Lindsey, the Court emphasized its inability "to
perceive in that document [the Constitution] any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality or any recognition of the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease.... "113
There is good reason for attempting to limit the fundamental
interest category. Every application of the strict standard of review
necessarily involves abandonment of the traditional presumption of
validity that the Court normally accords legislation. The Court
the Court has considered in deciding whether to accord special protection to a given
interest, see Supreme Court, 1969 Term, supra note 89, at 65-66; Comment, supra note
3, at 115-22.
112. 397 U.S. at 484 n.16. The theory that fundamental interests must be the subject
of independent constitutional protection first appeared in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Harper (383 U.S. at 682 n.3) and Shapiro (394 U.S. at 661-62) and Justice Stewart's
concurrence in Shapiro (394 U.S. at 643). It is not clear what the Court would require
in terms of independent constitutional protection. For example, in Shapiro the Court
held that the right to interstate travel was constitutionally protected but declined "to
ascribe the source of this right ••• to a particular constitutional provision," 394 U.S.
at 630. Justice Harlan, who was not satisfied with this analysis, concluded that the
right to interstate travel must be found in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 394 U.S. at 671.
Moreover, it has been suggested that the recognized fundamental interests of voting
and fair criminal procedure are not "constitutionally protected," Supreme Court, 1969
Term, supra note 89, at 65; Reinstein, supra note 89, at 42, See also Michelman, supra
note 3, at 17 n.25. For example, in Griffin v. Illinois, the Court noted that the states
were not constitutionally required to provide an appellate process. 351 U.S. at 18. In
Harper, the Court declined to link the right to vote in state elections to anything more
specific than the equal protection clause, although it intimated that the right might
be found in the first amendment. 383 U.S. at 665. Thus it is unlikely that the Court
would require that the specific right at issue in a particular case be explicitly pro•
tected in the text of the Constitution before it can be considered fundamental. Rather,
a general constitutional reference to the area of interest would probably be sufficient.
The references to voting in articles I and II and in the twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth,
seventeenth, nineteenth, twenty-fourth, and nventy-sLxth amendments would certainly
provide sufficient independent constitutional protection for that interest. Likewise, the
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth amendments should afford constitutional protection
to fair criminal procedure. But see Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 435, 438 (1967). The mere mention of an
interest in the Constitution, however, such as the right to contract, does not necessarily render it fundamental.
Surely the Court does not intend to discontinue its practice of strictly scrutinizing
classifications that affect criminal procedure and voting. Since Dandridge, the Court
has reaffirmed the applicability of strict review to criminal procedure cases in Williams
v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). Likewise, the
Court has continued to apply strict review to voting cases such as Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134 (1972). See Comment, supra note 3, at 129-30 for the argument that the
"independent constitutional protection" requirement of Dandridge is an aberration that
will not preclude the recognition of education as a fundamental interest.
113. 405 U.S. at 74.
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might limit its stricter scrutiny to classifications in those areas expressly mentioned in the text of the Constitution, thereby fulfilling
its duties as arbiter of the Constitution and at the same time avoiding an overly broad incursion into the legislative function. The
Court's seemingly ad hoc applications of the strict standard of
review have exposed it to the criticism that it uses the "fundamental
interest" doctrine to impose its own value judgments on the nation.114
The Court may prefer to instill more objectivity and predictability
into the determination of fundamental interests and thereby to
dispel the notion that it decides whether to afford extra judicial
protection to an interest on the basis of the Court's evaluation of
its importance.116 The requirement of "independent constitutional
protection" seems to be the most feasible means for accomplishing
these objectives without abandoning the fundamental interest concept entirely.
If the Court intends such a limitation, education could claim
"fundamental" status only through a strained interpretation of an
"independent constitutional basis," since education is nowhere mentioned in the text of the Constitution. Thus, to grant special status
to education would destroy any hope of infusing more objectivity
into the selection of fundamental interests.
There are other reasons for concluding that education will not
be recognized as a fundamental interest by the Supreme Court. Recognition of education as a fundamental interest would require the
Court to scrutinize carefully a great variety of classifications that
affect access to public education.116 Given the magnitude of public
education systems in our society, the multitude of classifications that
are necessary for their operation, and the differences of opinion surrounding educational decision-making, it may be assumed that application of the strict standard of review to all classifications in the area
of public education would result in an undesirable deluge of litigation. Moreover, even if the Court were ·willing to scrutinize strictly
discriminations in the area of education, it might refrain from doing
so for fear of opening the floodgates to strict review of classifications
that affect other municipal services.117 Education is undoubtedly
114. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (Black, J., dissenting).
115. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 110, at 130; Supreme Court, 1969
Term, supra note 89, at 64.
116. But the Court has suggested that the strict standard is not automatically
applicable whenever a classification imposes an incidental burden on a fundamental
interest. Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). The same reasoning would doubt•
lessly apply to education if it were recognized as a fundamental interest. Nevertheless,
the Court would still strictly scrutinize many classifications directly affecting education
that would have created few problems under the traditional test.
117. The California supreme court rejected the argument that the school financing
systems should not be invalidated because this would lead to similar action in respect to
other municipal services. 5 Cal. 3d at 613-14, 487 P.2d at 1262-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
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more important than most other municipal services, but, arguably,
it is no more crucial than police, fire, and sanitation services. The
Court may prefer not to weigh the importance of all types of municipal services and select those that are critical enough to merit "special"
equal protection. To escape the burden of making fine distinctions,
the Court may simply elect to withhold fundamental interest recognition from all municipal services, including education.118
3. Do Current Educational Financing Systems Create Inherently
Suspect Classifications?

An alternative ground for the California supreme court's decision to scrutinize strictly the state's school financing program was
that it created a wealth classification and that such classifications are
inherently suspect.119 The cases that arguably support the proposi622-23. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 414-19 suggests that the
five policy reasons on which the California supreme court based its recognition of
education as a fundamental interest (see notes 92-104 supra and accompanying text)
provide a means for distinguishing education from other municipal services. See also
Comment, supra note 3, at 154-64 for a discussion of the significance of Serrano to the
equalization of other municipal services under the fourteenth amendment.
Nevertheless, some lawyers apparently are convinced that recognition of education
as a fundamental interest will spawn effective challenges to unequal provision of all
municipal services. Andrews, Tax 'Revolution' School Ruling Is Seen Changing the
Nature of U.S., Cities, Suburbs, Wall St. J., March 13, 1972, at I, col. 6; at 10, col. 6
[hereinafter Andrews]:
Serrano "opens a very large door," says John Silard, a Washington, D.C.,
attorney involved in school-tax litigation. For the first time, he says, the courts are
requiring "equal protection" in public programs. • • • In his view, this means "a
revolution in [public] services." The schools, he predicts, are merely "the first bite
at the big apple. Welfare obviously comes next, and I guess health, too."
Perhaps understandably, the lawyers closest to the Serrano suits play down

talk of sweeping revisions m public services. The success of their litigation depends

in good part on a painstaking legal theory that education is something special"a fundamental interest" in constitutional parlance•
• • • Some lawyers predict that if education is accepted as a fundamental
interest other public services are bound to follow. But they don't like to say it
out loud. "They want this to stick," one attorney says. ''You stress that education
isn't like garbage. We arc playing a game here. You have to [in order] not to
frighten the courts away from a proposition that's sound."
Apparently, these lawyers are convinced that Supreme Court Justices do not read The
Wall Street Journal.
Currently the leading case involving discrimination in tl1e provision of municipal
services is Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (1971), in which the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a municipality may not discriminate on tlte
basis of race in the provision of such services as sewage facilities, paved streets, lighting
and fire hydrants. See generally Ratner, Inter-Neighborhood Denials of Equal Protection in the Provision of Municipal Services, 4 HARv. CIV. RicHTS-C1v. Lm. L. REv. 1
(1968); Note, The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 37 BROOKLYN L. REV. 568 (1971).
118. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note llO, at 130; Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
supra note 89, at 70.
119. 5 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
For a discussion of whether wealth is or should be a suspect classification, sec
PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDucATION, supra note 3, at 339-76; Michelman, supra
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tion that wealth is a suspect classification are primarily concerned
with individual rather than collective wealth.120 The Serrano court
accepted as true on demurrer the plaintiff's allegations that there
was a positive correlation between the wealth of the districts in terms
of taxable property and the personal wealth of the districts' inhabitants.121 This conclusion may be hasty, given the presence of substantial amounts of valuable commercial and industrial property in
districts inhabited by the poor.122 Thus it is questionable whether
the plaintiffs ·will be able to establish that poor people as such are
singled out and victimized by current school financing systems. But
the court declared that, regardless of such a correlation, discriminations based upon district wealth were as equally "suspect" as discriminations based upon individual wealth.123 The court reasoned that
the amount of money spent on a child's education should not depend
upon the presence or absence of valuable commercial and industrial
property within his school district.124 Furthermore, in responding to
the contention that this wealth discrimination was unintentional,125
the court noted that the governmental action was in large part responsible for the intradistrict disparities in taxable property since
the financing system was mandated by the state constitution and
statutes, the distribution of valuable property was partially controlled by zoning and land-use ordinances, and the school district
note 3; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection_ and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 785-87 (1969); Comment, supra note 3, at 130-48; Note,
Exclusionary Zoning, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, 1650-62 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must
a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 MICH. L. REv. 339, 344-48 (1970).
120. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 {1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). It has been
suggested that in these cases the effect of the wealth discrimination was total deprivation of the commodities involved since the indigent was too poor to afford a transcript,
hire an attorney, or pay the poll tax. In the educational financing situation, the
deprivation is only partial since a minimum amount of money is spent on the
education of all children. See Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 147 n.3. The Supreme
Court might consider this distinction crucial.
121. 5 Cal. 3d at 600-01, 487 P .2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
122. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114. But see Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (1971) where it is suggested that such a correlation does exist in Texas, and Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 243-46, 387
A.2d 187, 199-205 (1972) for the assertion that this correlation exists in New Jersey.
123. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P .2d at 1252, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
124. 5 Cal. 3d at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13.
125. 5 Cal. 3d at 601-03, 487 P.2d at 1253-54, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14. The court
declared that it was not necessary that the discrimination be intentional in order to
constitute a denial of equal protection. It noted that classifications invalidated by the
Supreme Court in Griffen, Douglas, and Harper were not purposefully discriminatory.
Along the same lines, the Serrano court rejected the defendant's analogy that the
wealth discriminations were constitutional since they were comparable to de facto
segregation. The court emphasized the degree of state action involved and noted that
California has declared de facto school segregation unconstitutional. 5 Cal. 3d at 601-04,
487 P.2d at 1253-55, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-15.
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boundaries were drawn by the government. 120 Given these factors,
if the Supreme Court is ·willing to accept the characterization of
wealth as a suspect classification at all, it might be willing to apply
the principle to wealth discriminations between districts as well as
between individuals.
In concluding that wealth is a suspect classification, the Serrano
court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Harper v. Virginia
Board of Elections that " '[l]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or
property, like those of race ... , are traditionally disfavored' " 127 and
the Court's assertion in 1v.IcDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners128 that " 'a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth .•. [a factor]
which would independently render a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny.' " 129 The fact
remains, however, that every case in which the Court has applied
the stricter standard of review to classifications based on "wealth"
also involved the fundamental interests of voting or fair criminal
procedure; the presence of wealth classifications alone has not yet
activated the strict standard of review.
To the contrary, the recent case of James v. Valtierra strongly
suggests that wealth is not a suspect classification. In Valtierra, the
Court held that the California constitution's provision that low-rent
housing projects could not be developed or constructed by the state
until "approved by the voters in a local referendum" 180 was not a
denial of equal protection of the laws. 181 The Court distinguished132
Hunter v. Ericksen,133 which held that an amendment to the Akron,
Ohio, City Charter requiring voter approval of any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race, creed, color, or national origin
violated the equal protection clause. The Court quoted from Hunter
the observation that " 'racial classifications are "constitutionally
suspect" ... and subject to the "most rigid scrutiny.'' ... They "bear
126. 5 Cal. 3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1259-60, 96 Cal. Rptr. 619-20.
127. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610, qttoting 383 U.S. at
668. But see Michelman, supra note 3, at 24-25, where it is suggested that Harper is
more appropriately interpreted as a statement on voting rights than as a statement on
wealth classifications. See also Cox, supra note 111, at 95-96,
128. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
129. 5 Cal. 3d at 597, 487 P.2d 1250, 96 Cal, Rptr. at 610, qttoting 394 U.S. at 807,
In McDonald, plaintiff alleged that an Illinois statute denied equal protection of the
laws to prisoners unable to obtain bail since it did not include them in the category of
persons allowed to vote by absentee ballot. After it characterized wealth as a suspect
classification, however, the Court held that no classification based upon wealth was
involved since the petitioners had not shown that they were denied the right to vote,
130. CAL. CONST. art. XXXIV.
131. 402 U.S. at 143.
132, 402 U.S. at 140-41.
133. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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a far heavier burden of justification" than other classifications.' " 134
The Court noted, however, that there was nothing in the record to
suggest that the California law was implicitly intended to discriminate against a racial minority.185 Thus the Court concluded, "The
present case could be affirmed only by extending Hunter and this
we decline to do." 136
In his dissent in Valtierra, Justice Marshall argued that "[t]he
article [of the California constitution] explicitly singles out lowincome persons to bear its burden.... It is ... an explicit classification on the basis of poverty-a suspect classification which demands
exacting judicial scrutiny...." 131 Given the thrust of Justice Marshall's dissent, the majority's emphasis on the "suspect classification
of race" involved in Hunter, and its stated refusal to extend Hunter,
the implication is strong that the Court did not regard a discrimination on the basis of wealth alone as a suspect classification capable
of activating the strict standard of review. But since the majority
did not directly address this issue, it is presumably still open.138
Commentators have suggested, however, that there are critical
differences between such previously recognized suspect classifications
as race and ancestry and classifications based upon wealth. It is more
difficult to identify the poor as a discrete group than it is to identify
distinct racial and national minorities.1311 In addition, wealth is a
matter of degree, rather than kind.140 Thus, wealth classifications are
less obviously arbitrary than, for example, racial discriminations.
134. 402 U.S. at 141, quoting 393 U.S. at 391-92.
135. 402 U.S. at 141.
136. 402 U.S. at 141.
137. 402 U.S. at 144-45. Justice Marshall observed that by its own terms article
XXXIV is applicable only to "any development composed of urban or rural dwellings,
apartments or other living accommodations for persons of low income, financed in
whole or in part by the Federal Government or a state public body." Persons of low
income are defined as "persons or families who lack the amount of income which is
necessary ••• to enable them, without financial assistance, to live in decent, safe and
sanitary dwellings, without overcrowding." 402 U.S. at 143-44.
This is probably the most explicit discrimination based on wealth that the Court is
likely to encounter.
138. The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity to characterize wealth as a
suspect classification in some recent cases. One example is Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to condition
access to the courts in divorce proceedings on the payment of filing fees. Despite a
long line of decisions concerning indigents' rights in criminal proceedings based on
the equal protection as well as the due process clause, the Court limited its holding to
due process. The Court attempted to restrict further the 5'\leep of its holding by
emphasizing the importance of marriage in our society. 401 U.S. at 376. Both
Justices Douglas and Brennan argued, in concurring opinions, that an equal
protection rationale would have been more appropriate. 401 U.S. at 383-86, 386-89.
Cf. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
139. See Note, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645, supra note 119, at 1659. But there are at
least some standards for identifying the poor. Id.
140. Id,
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Furthermore, poverty, unlike race or ancestry, is a remediable condition.141 Finally, classifications involving the payment of money are
accepted as necessary to our economic system.142 In view of these
differences the Court might not be as willing to review classifications
based on wealth as strictly as those based on race, ancestry, or
alienage.143
It should be noted that the recognition of wealth as a suspect
classification would be potentially even more expansive than recognition of education as a fundamental interest.144 Such a precedent
would require the application of the strict standard whenever a
plaintiff alleged that a wealthier district was able to provide better
police protection, fire protection, park service, or sewage disposal.
It would be unnecessary to argue that there is a fundamental interest in these services if the presence of wealth discrimination alone
were sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny. Practically any statute that
conditions reception of a benefit or avoidance of a burden on payment of a fee or on financial status would be subject to serious
challenge.145 It is unlikely the Court would be willing to adopt this
doctrine since it would involve the Court in a series of sweeping
economic reforms that could only be characterized as "legislative"
in nature.
4. Does the Combination of Wealth Discrimination in the Area of
Education Require the Strict Standard of Review?
Traditionally, it has been assumed that either a fundamental
interest or a suspect criterion is sufficient to warrant application of
the strict standard of review to a legislative classification.146 The
propositions that education is a fundamental interest and that wealth
classifications are inherently suspect are apparently inconsistent with
the current trend in Supreme Court decisions.147 However, the
141. Sager, supra note 119, at 787.
142. Id. at 786.
143. But for the argument that the poor deserve extra protection under the equal
protection clause due to their lack of political strength, see Michelman, supra note 3,
at 21; Note, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 1615, supra note 119, at 1658-61; Supreme Court, 1970
Term, supra note 110, at 128-29.
144. The Court appears to be concerned with restricting the further expansion of
the suspect classification category as well as the category of fundamental interests. For
example, despite some promising dicta in earlier cases, the Court recently declined to
recognize illegitimacy as a suspect classification. Compare Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532 (1971), with Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Weber v. Aetna Cas. &:
Surety Co., 40 U.SL.W. 4460 (U.S. April 24, 1972).
145. See Michelman, supra note 3, for the possible distinction between "payment"
and "wealth" classifications, and for an alternative approach to protecting the poor
under the equal protection clause.
146. See, e.g., Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
147. Yet another theory might be drawn from the opinion in Serrano. The court
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California court in Serrano may have been justified in applying the
strict standard to the state's school :financing system due to the existence of a classification that affected education and was based on
wealth.148 The Supreme Court may be less relucta,nt to extend the
strict standard to cases that involve both education and wealth classifications since such an extension would be less expansive than an
extension to all cases that involve just one of those factors.
Application of the strict standard to the combination of an important, but nonfundamental, interest and a disfavored, but nonsuspect, classification would lend itself to either of two possible
interpretations. On the one hand, it might suggest that the Court is
recognizing a category of hybrids that will be subjected to strict
scrutiny. Or it might suggest that the Court will evaluate the relative
importance of the interest at stake and the invidiousness of the
classification involved in a given case and adjust the standard of
review accordingly.149 Both of these possibilities are appealing since
suggested that the state may not discriminate on a geographical basis where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved. 5 Cal. 3d at 612, 487 P.2d at 1261,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 621. The court first drew support from school closing cases in which
the Supreme Court has invalidated efforts to close schools in one part of the state
while other schools continued to operate. Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), affd.
mem., 368 U.S. 515 (1962). These cases, however, are distinguishable from the
educational financing litigation in that they involved blatant racial discrimination. In
addition, the children involved were completely denied the opportunity to attend
public schools rather than merely denied equal educational expenditures.
The California supreme court also relied upon the reapportionment cases,
especially Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to support this proposition. Specifically,
the court quoted the Supreme Court's statement in Reynolds that " 'Diluting the
weight of votes because of place of residence impairs basic constitutional rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment just as much as invidious discrimination based upon
factors such as race ••• or economic status •••• ,' " and concluded that "[i)f a voter's
address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is entitled, surely it should
not determine the quality of the child's education." 5 Cal. 3d ~t 613, 487 P .2d at 1262,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 622, quoting 377 U.S. at 566.
For an extensive analysis of the validity of geographical classifications under the
equal protection clause, see Horowitz &: Neitring, supra note 3. See also A. WISE, supra
note 3, at 171-72. But see PRlvATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at
350-55 (the geographical discrimination theory is an inappropriate vehicle for challenging educational financing systems under the equal protection clause).
148. It is unclear from the court's opinion in Serrano whether it rested its decision
on the education-fundamental interest factor, the wealth-suspect criterion factor, or
a combination of both. It has been suggested that classifications based upon wealth only
require strict review when coupled with a fundamental interest. PRlvATE WEALTH AND
Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 344; Note, 69 Mica. L. REv. 339, supra note 119, at
347. But as Professor Michelman suggests, supra note 3, at 22-23, such an analysis
implies that the "classification of wealth" is of little significance since the strict
standard of review wou1d apply in any event because of the fundamental interest
involved. For example, when voting is at stake, the Court will apply the strict standard
of review to classifications based upon factors other than wealth. See, e.g., Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
149. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 111, at 95; Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 UCLA L.
REv. 716, 744 (1969); Comment, supra note 3, at 148-51.
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they would result in a more flexible approach to equal protection
questions. However, flexibility necessarily engenders a degree of uncertainty, and this is a factor that the Court would presumably like
to minimize in this area.100
Furthermore, strict scrutiny of the combination of wealth discriminations in the area of education would still expand use of the
strict standard of review beyond its current perimeters. The Court
would burden itself with the complex task of value-balancing that it
apparently desires to avoid. For it would eventually have to determine whether wealth classifications that affect other important interests, such as subsistence, housing, and municipal services, warrant
strict scrutiny despite the fact that the interests involved are not
"fundamental." Therefore, the Serrano doctrine itself will probably
receive a great deal of "strict scrutiny" when it is considered by the
highest court of the land.
C.

School Financing Systems Under the Traditional
Equal Protection Standard

Even if the Supreme Court should decide that the strict standard
of review is inapplicable to the educational financing litigation,
there remains the possibility of invalidating the systems under the
traditional equal protection standard.151 While basing their decisions
on the strict standard, federal courts in Van Dusartz162 and Rodriguez163 have indicated that the states' school financing systems might
not withstand analysis under the rational basis test either.
In applying the traditional standard of equal protection, the
Court has stated that a classification must have a " 'fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' "m Occasionally, however,
the Court has emphasized the laxity of the traditional approach
noting that "a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it"16G or unless
it is "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's objectives.''160
In some instances the Court has subjected legislation to only the most
cursory review, 167 accepting purposes of marginal relevance as suf150. Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra note 110, at UIO.
151. See A. WISE, supra note 3, at 178-84; PRIVATE WEALTII AND PUBLIC .EDUCATION,
supra note 3, at 334-37: Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 19-20, But see PRIVATE WEALTH
AND PUBLIC .EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 326-34.
152. 334 F. Supp. at 874.
153. 337 F. Supp. at 284.
154. E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
155. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
156. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
157. In Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), tl1c Court upheld a Louisiana statute
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ficient justification for sustaining the classifications.158 In other cases,
however, the Court has engaged in a more demanding search for a
"rational basis" for the legislation in question.159 The Court has
offered no explanation for these apparent variations in intensity of
review under the traditional standard. It may be noted, however, that
the Court has been especially lax in those cases involving business
regulations,160 and this may be the most appropriate approach in
these instances. Arguably, the Court exercises a somewhat more demanding review of classifications involving personal, but nonfundamental, interests-such as education or subsistence benefits-under
the traditional standard.161 The success of the challenge to educational financing under the traditional standard is dependent upon
such a conscientious search for a rational basis.
The quest for a rationally related purpose is complicated by the
fact that complex legislation often bears many purposes, some of
which may be inconsistent. The determination reached under the
traditional equal protection standard may be contingent upon what
is characterized as a legislative purpose.
Arguably, the dominant purpose of an educational :financing
method is to create a system of equal educational opportunity.162
Indeed, many state constitutions contain clauses that guarantee equal
education to all.168 Considering the large discrepancies in expenditures among school districts that are engendered by the current
systems, it would seem that they are not rationally related to this
purpose.164 The legitimate purpose of promoting local control over
educational spending and decision-making will no doubt be set forth
that denied the rights of intestate succession to illegitimate children who had not
been both acknowledged and legitimated. Although the classification was attacked
under the equal protection clause, the Court decided the case on the ground that the
state legislature had the power to pass laws regulating intestate succession. 401 U.S. at
538. In a footnote the Court acknowledged that it could have found a rational basis
for the classification but failed to say why it was not necessary to do so. 401 U.S. at
536 n.6. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan charged that the majority's refusal to
consider the issue in terms of even the restrained standard of review marked a new
and unfortunate approach to equal protection. 401 U.S. at 548-50.
158. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (sus•
taining a New York statute which, as a safety measure, prohibited trucks from carrying
advertising except when a product of the truck owner was advertised).
159. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating a Massachusetts
criminal statute which prohibited the gratuitous distribution of contraceptives).
160. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
161. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
162. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 334.
163. Id. The court in Van Dusartz commented, "If the State's objective is a 'general
and uniform system' of education, as Article VIII, Section I of the Minnesota Constitution declares, it might be wondered whether the means chosen are rationally adapted
to that goal." 334 F. Supp. at 874.
164. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 335.
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as a rational basis for the current financing systems. The Mcinnis
court accepted this rationale, stressing that it was desirable to allow
local districts to choose their own tax rates and select their own priorities as between education and other municipal services.166 These
conclusions may not be controlling in the current litigation before
the Court, however, since the court in Mcinnis also grounded its
decision upon the lack of judicially manageable standards.166 Commentators have argued that just as much local control could be obtained under more equalized financing systems.167
But under the traditional standard of review, a state is not required to utilize the least onerous method for accomplishing its
purpose,168 thus the existence of a potentially better system would
not require the invalidation of the current one. However, it is arguable that current financing systems do not even effectively encourage
local control over decision-making since poorer school districts may
contain so little taxable wealth that they have no effective means £or
increasing educational expendittires.169 As the Serrano court noted,
"[A]ffiuent districts can have their cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education for their children while paying lower
taxes. Poor districts, by contrast have no cake at all.''170 Thus local
control of decision-making may not be a valid justification for the
current systems. Nevertheless, the Court could conclude that as long
as the state does not place an upper limit on the level at which a
district may tax itself, poorer districts can raise additional revenue
by taxing themselves at higher rates and thereby retaining a sufficient
degree of control over revenue. Thus arguments for invalidating the
:financing systems under the rational basis test are vulnerable.171
165. 293 F. Supp. at 333.
166. 293 F. Supp. at 335.
167. See PRIVATE WEAL111 AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 14-20, 34.35, 306,
432, for the argument that local control over educational decision-making and spending (which they characterize as "subsidiarity") can be achieved under a more equalized
system of educational finance. See note 186 infra for a description of such a system.
168. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 333 (N.D. ill. 1968), citing Metropolis
Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 661 (1913).
169. The court in Van Dusartz doubted whether encouraging local control over
decision-making provided a rational basis:
By its own acts, the State has indicated that it is not primarily interested in local
choice in school matters. In fact, rather than reposing in each school district the
economic power to fix its own level of per pupil expenditure, the State has so
arranged the structure as to guarantee that some districts will spend low (with
high taxes) while others will spend high (with low taxes). To promote such an
erratic dispersal of privilege and burden on a theory of local control of spending
would be quite impossible,
334 F. Supp. at 876.
170. 5 Cal. 3d at 600, 487 P.2d at 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 611,12,
171. See PRIVATE WEAL111 AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 326-34, for
criticism of the traditional standard of review.
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Professor Schoettle has suggested a different approach for challenging educational financing systems under the rational basis test.172
He argues that financing methods that depend on assessable property
within individual school districts require voters in poorer districts
to "bear a heavier burden of electoral persuasion" than those in
wealthier districts in order to raise similar amounts of revenue for
the operation of schools.173 Analogizing to Baker v. Carr174 and other
reapportionment decisions, he contends that the financing systems
dilute the votes of residents in poorer districts in much the same
manner as malapportionment of state legislatures diluted the franchise of voters in more populous districts.175 He concludes that the
systems violate the equal protection clause since no rational basis
can exist for a system which creates such gross disparities in revenueraising capacity.176 Extending this argument to its logical conclusion,
he suggests that the Court should nullify financing systems that create
large disparities in revenue-raising ability among districts for all
municipal services and not simply for education.177 This theory has
the virtue of invalidating current financing systems without an expansive application of the strict standard of review and without the
necessity of establishing a causal relationship between educational
expenditures and educational achievement.178
However, this theory is in other respects even broader than the
Serrano approach. As noted above, the Serrano decision to apply the
strict standard of review to California's school financing system can
be limited to cases in which a statute creates a wealth classification
affecting education. Schoettle's theory would involve the Court in
equal protection scrutiny of wealth classifications with respect to all
municipal services.
Furthermore, there is some question whether the analogy between school financing legislation and legislative apportionment is
appropriate. Baker and its progeny involved malapportionment of
legislative districts that diluted some citizens' votes for state legislators, who represent their constituents on the full range of political
issues. In contrast, the educational financing cases involve disparity
in voting power among groups of citizens on only one issue: the rate
at which districts tax themselves on their property. Thus deviation
from the "one man-one vote" principle in the educational financing
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1407-12.
Id. at 1407-09.
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1409.
Id. at 1405-06.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1411-12.
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context does not harm disadvantaged voters as extensively as in the
legislative apportionment setting.179
The traditional standard of review may serve as an escape valve
for the Supreme Court if it desires to invalidate the controversial
educational financing systems without expanding the strict standard
of review.
Ill.

JUSTICIABILITY, COSTS OF REFORM, AND THE PROPRIETY
OF A JUDICIAL SOLUTION

A. ]usticiability
The decision in Mclnnis rested partially, if not totally, on lack of
justiciability, since the court determined that there were no judicially
manageable standards for resolution of the litigation.189 The plaintiffs asserted that educational expenditures should be apportioned
according to the individual student's educational needs. 181 The threejudge district court concluded that it was incapable of determining
what a student's needs were, and consequently that it could not apply
the standard for resolution proposed by plaintiffs.182
Plaintiffs in more recent school financing cases have offered a
standard that is far narrower and more concrete than the educational
needs standard advanced in Mclnnis. In Rodriguez, the case currently before the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs convinced the threejudge federal district court to accept the principle of fiscal neutrality
as the proper judicial standard for resolution of the controversy.188
Simply stated, "fiscal neutrality" means that "the quality of public
education may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of
the state [as a whole]." 184 This standard does not attempt to measure
179. For further comment on Schoettle's proposal, see Goldstein, supra note 8, at
542-43; Karst, supra note 3, at 752-54.
·
180. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36. See Baker v. Carr, 339 U.S. 186, 217 (1962): McCloskey,
Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1962). McCloskey observes,
"It seems fairly clear that for Justice Brennan [the author of the Baker opinion] 'tl1e
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards' is the only reason that
might cause the Court to call a question involving state governmental arrangements a
political question." Id. at 60 (emphasis original). See also Silard &: White, supra note
3, at 23-24.
181. 293 F. Supp. at 329.
182. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36.
183. 337 F. Supp. at 283-84. The court in Van Dusart1. e.;:pressly accepted the fiscal
neutrality standard. 334 F. Supp. at 872. It has been suggested that the court in
Serrano impliedly accepted that standard at 5 Cal. lld at 587, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96
Cal. Rptr. at 604. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 120 n.3. Professor Wise in School
Finance, supra note 3, at 124, notes that Serrano can be read as requiring more tllan
mere fiscal neutrality. He suggests that the court's opinion may mean that the
quality of a child's education may not be a function of "where [he] lives, what his
parental circumstances are, or how highly his neighbors value education,"
184. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note a, at 304. See also First
Appraisal, supra note 3, at 111.
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such complex concepts as "educational opportunity" or "educational
needs," but rather is concerned primarily with equality of revenueraising capacity. If all school districts within the state can collect
substantially equal amounts of revenue per pupil by taxing themselves at the same rate, the neutrality standard is satisfied.185 The
fiscal neutrality standard has the virtue that it allows state legislatures
great flexibility in fashioning an alternative system so long as conditions of local wealth are disregarded.186 Since the standard concen185. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114.
186. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 307. See First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 116, describing five model financing systems that satisfy fiscal
neutrality. See also School Finance, supra note 3, at 127-30 ("A Model Legislative
Response" to fiscal neutrality, designed for Maryland); Comment, supra note 3, at 187-98.
One means of achieving fiscal neutrality would be for the state to assume the
entire burden of financing public education. This alternative has been recommended
by The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in STATE .AID TO LoCAL
GOVERNMENT (1969), the Fleischman Commission in New York, the National Educational
Finance Project, and Governor Milliken of Michigan in REPORT OF THE GoVERNoR's CoMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM (1969). For a consideration of these proposals, see
School Finance, supra note 3, at 125-27. See also Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 30.
Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at 145, emphasize that under the fiscal neutrality
standard
[the] legislature could choose to centralize or decentralize either revenue raising
or school governance; it could employ a state-wide property tax, an industrial
property tax, an income tax; or it could opt for • • • compensatory education
programs •••• A legislature may choose to allocate funds on the basis of the
characteristics of the consumers of the service, the children.
Another alternative ••. is an allocation of funds based on the characteristics of
each school district•••• mhe number of pupils, the number of schools, the willingness of a district to make a greater or lesser property tax effort . • . and the
degree of racial integration within the district could be considered in allocating
money. Extra dollars could be distributed to communities where the cost of providing educational services ••• is appreciably higher. Older industrial communities could be compensated for ••• municipal overburden ••••
A state legislature might decide to make education funds available on the basis
of family characteristics. If a family is poor, their poverty could be treated as
shorthand for the greater educational requirements of the children in the family.•••
Thus, the funding remedies which may flow from the Serrano decision are
compatible with any legitimate state interest in educational governance. • • •
See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 33-35, 200-42, for a
detailed analysis of "power equalizing," a system that allegedly satisfies the fiscal
neutrality standard and still retains local control. "District power equalizing" allows
the state to maintain local districts and even continue to raise school revenue through
local property taxes. The state would set a maximum limit on the amount of revenue
that a district could spend if it chose to tax itself at a given rate. If the district is unable
to raise the specified amount by taxing at the prescribed rate, the state would furnish
the difference; and if a district could raise more than the specified amount at a prescribed level, the state would collect and redistribute the excess. Since each district
would be free to choose the level at which it would tax itself, the amount of revenue
raised within the district would depend upon the district's willingness to tax itself
rather than upon its wealth in terms of taxable property.
District power equalizing may not go far enough in equalizing educational expenditures since disparities due to differences in district tax effort may be no more
defensible than those due to the district wealth. PRIVATE "WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION,
supra note 3, at 256-68; Michelman, supra note 3, at 53-56; Kirp & Yudof, Book Review,
supra note 3, at 625. Therefore, it is contended that a "family power equalizing"
scheme would be more appropriate. Michelman, supra note 3, at 53. Under this plan,
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trates on concrete figures rather than elusive concepts, it appears to
be judicially manageable.187
Assuming that the standard of fiscal neutrality is judicially manageable, it may be irrelevant to the goal of achieving educational
equality. Critics have suggested that concentration on equality of
expenditures or equality of revenue-raising capacity cannot eliminate
inequities in existing systems.188 Thus, some still maintain that the
Court must apply an affirmative, subjective standard such as "equal
learning opportunity," "equal educational achievement," or "equal
educational resources" if the Court's decision is to have any meaningful effect on education.189 It should be apparent, however, that whatever gains in relevancy might result from the more subjective standards must be balanced against the loss in judicial manageability of
the objective standard of fiscal neutrality. Given the competing
values inherent in an educational system and the inconclusiveness
of available data, it is difficult to see how the Court could intelligently select one of the subjective standards as opposed to another
and then proceed to sanctify it with constitutional protection.100 A
sacrifice of some degree of "relevancy" to actual educational problems seems inevitable if the Court intends to intervene at all. The
Court would be well advised to stick to the standard of fiscal neutrality, as it promises to be the most manageable of the alternatives.
the significant unit would be the family rather than the school district, The family
would choose the rate at which it would tax itself on its income per child. As with
district power equalizing, the family would be ensured of receiving a specified amount
at a given tax rate. The state would provide schools that offered varying degrees of
educational resources. The more that was offered, the higher would be the tuition.
The student would attend a school whose offering was commensurate with the tax
effort made by his family. It would be up to the child's family to decide what quality
level of education the child should receive. Such a plan could be administered through
education vouchers. See generally Coons &: Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: d
Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 321 (1971). The educational
voucher systems and the legal problems involved are discussed in Areen, Education
Vouchers, 6 HARv. CIV. R.IGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REv. 466 (1971).
Even those who support family power equalizing concede that it is a radical notion
unlikely to gain political acceptance in the near future. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 268. Furthermore, as noted by Professors Kirp and Yudof,
Book Review, supra note 3, at 625-26, it may be no more reasonable to allow expcndi•
tures on a child's education to depend upon the willingness of his family to tax itself
than it is to rely on the taxing attitude of his school district. Perhaps a plan that
focused only upon the needs of the individual child would be more equitable. How•
ever, that is exactly the type of proposal rejected in Mcinnis as unmanageable.
187. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 13.
188. See Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 26, 29.
189. For an exploration of the different possible standards of measuring educational
equality, see A. WISE, supra note 3, at 143-59. See also PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 304-11.
190. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 13, See also
Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1396.
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Recent data, most significantly the Coleman Report,191 also raise
the issue of whether disparities in educational expenditures bear any
relation to disparities in educational opportunity.192 The Coleman
Report is the result of a massive government study of racial segregation as well as the factors influencing educational opportunity and
achievement. The results of the study are quite controversial and
not easily summarized. Nevertheless, the study suggests that variations in the size of school facilities and faculties have very little effect
on educational achievement of students.193 Since the great bulk of
educational revenues are used to pay teachers and provide school
facilities, the data may suggest that inequalities in educational expenditures have little effect on the goal of ensuring quality education
to all.194 If it invalidates current educational financing systems, the
Court might promote fiscal equity and yet do little to advance educational opportunity.195
Nevertheless, the Coleman Report by no means conclusively
establishes that disparities in educational expenditures have no effect
on educational opportunity.196 Educators, legislators, and voters
apparently assume that higher expenditures will result in better
education since they continually increase educational spending. It
is arguable that poor districts ought to be able to proceed under the
191. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966) [hereinafter COLEMAN REPORT].
192. See Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1378-88. But see Silard & White, supra note 3,
at 10.
193. The study concluded that
schools bring little influence to bear on a child's achievement that is independent
of his background and general social context; and that this very lack of an independent effect means that the inequalities imposed on children by their home,
neighborhood and peer environment are carried along to become the inequalities
with which they confront adult life at the end of school.
O>LEMAN REPORT, supra note 191, at 325.
194. It is estimated by The National Center for Educational Statistics, Office of
Education, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Statistics of Local and
Public School Systems, 1967, at 15 (1969), dtecl by Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1359, that
local school districts spend as much as two thirds of their annual budgets to pay
teachers. Of course, a minimum amount of expenditures per pupil may be necessary
to provide a decent education even if a substantial increase in spending above that
amount will not significantly improve the quality of education. Dimond, supra note 3,
at 141 n.48. But this minimum amount may be provided in most states since a
minimum level of expenditures per pupil is generally guaranteed by the state.
195. School Finance, supra note 3, at 124, 130; Kirp & Yudof, Book Review, supra
note 3, at 625.
196. See J. GUTHRIE, G. KLEINDORFER, H. LEvIN, R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY
57-84 (1971) for the argument that there is a positive correlation between educational
services (hence educational expenditures) and educational achievement. See ON EQUALITY
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1972) for a recent and largely favorable reassessment of
the COLEMAN REPORT. For other recent studies assessing the methods and conclusions
of the COLEMAN REPORT, see Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1387.
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same assumption, however dubious, as wealthier districts107 and
spend the same amount as those districts with no greater tax effort.
"Fiscal neutrality" is a judicially manageable standard by which
the Court could redress inequities in educational finance, but given
the complex nature of the problem, a decision to overturn the present methods of educational finance may not have a significant effect
upon the quality of education. The Court must decide whether the
benefits of such a decision in terms of fiscal equity and the possibility
of increased educational achievement outweigh the costs of overturning most of the nation's educational financing systems.
B.

Costs of Reform

Another consideration arises from the magnitude of the school
financing litigation. Most states depend on local property ta.xes to
finance public education. If the Supreme Court should decide that
one of the state systems of financing education violates equal protection, most of the states would be forced to abandon their current
systems and adopt acceptable alternatives. The consequences of such
a decision would be of enormous magnitude. Nevertheless, the integration and reapportionment decisions illustrate that the Court
is willing to attack a problem of immense proportion when it is convinced that critical issues are at stake and that judicial action is
necessary.
Before it becomes involved in a problem of the dimensions of
school financing, the Court thoroughly considers the legislative as
well as the judicial costs. The costs that the Court would impose
upon state legislatures by invalidating current educational financing
schemes fall into two categories. First, legislatures would have to
expend considerable time and effort in developing a constitutionally
acceptable scheme for financing public education. Second, it may
cost the states far more to operate financing systems that equalize
districts' spending than to operate the current systems.
As in desegregation and reapportionment cases, the burden of
producing new financing systems would be on the state legislatures
if the Court chose to overturn the current systems.198 Given the current popular dissatisfaction with property taxes and with present
educational financing systems, most state legislatures may find it necessary to initiate educational financing reforms in the near future
with or without an order from the Court. Since alternative school
:financing schemes have already been proposed, the legislatures would
197. See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1971): PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 30. See note 35 supra.
198. In Rodriguez, the court ordered the legislature to restructure the financing
system within two years to conform with the concept of fiscal neutrality. 337 F. Supp.
at 286.
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not have to start from scratch. The cost of devising a new program is not likely to be prohibitive.
On the other hand, the potential costs of operating a new system
carry greater weight. It appears that a system of educational finance
that equalizes expenditures by districts must inevitably be a more
expensive system.199 Equality could be achieved either by "leveling"
the highest-spending districts down or by "leveling" the lowestspending districts up. 200 Those districts capable of supporting a high
level of spending will be adamantly opposed to a "leveling down."
Consequently, "leveling up" may be the only politically feasible
course of action, 201 but it would probably require a higher aggregate
level of spending on education than the current system.202 Whatever
system a state adopts to equalize district spending, it is virtually inevitable that the state itself will have to furnish substantially more
money for education from the state treasury. In view of the current
budgetary difficulties that many states are experiencing as well as
the developing taxpayers' revolt, the necessity for increased state aid
to education could create severe problems for state legislatures.
In addition to legislative costs, the Court must also consider the
judicial costs of invalidating state educational financing systems in
terms of the judicial effort that would be required to supervise a
reform plan. Given the already crowded federal dockets, as well as
the Court'~ enduring commitment to school integration, the Court
must decide whether the benefits that may result from judicial reform
justify the commitment of judicial resources that may be necessary.
Certainly, it is unlikely that the Court could dispose of the issue
with one decision. The variety of existing financing systems and acceptable alternatives would undoubtedly result in the Supreme
Court's hearing an entire line of cases. As with the desegregation and
reapportionment cases, the federal district courts would have to
maintain continuing jurisdiction to police and eventually ratify
state legislative reforms.208
In a large measure, the extent of the judicial commitment would
probably depend upon the degree of public resistance to the Court's
199. But see First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 121 n.45.
200. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 590-91. See also Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 3, at
624-26.
201. But see Kurland, supra note 3, at 590.
202. Silard &: White, supra note 3, at 31-32. A special New York Commission that
recently completed a study of educational financing in that state suggested that the
state "level up" the poorer districts over a five-year period. It estimated that such a
process would cost the state an additional 715 million dollars per year. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 29, 1972, at I, col. 8. Likewise, the proposed model reform of Maryland's school
financing system, School Finance, supra note 3, at 128-29, recommends that the state
raise all districts to the level of expenditures by the highest-spending district. It is
estimated that this would cost an additional 200 million dollars per year.
203. See PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 447-48.
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decision. 204 If the public accepts the Court's judgment, the Court
could probably implement its decree with a reasonable expenditure
of time and effort. If public resistance is significant, however, the
Court might find itself involved in an enduring struggle to implement its orders. The integration cases well illustrate this point.2M
It is possible that the politically powerful suburban districts would
respond negatively to a Supreme Court decision overturning state
educational financing schemes out of fear that their well-financed
schools would be sacrificed on the altar of general equality.200 Suburbanites could protect the quality of their schools by insisting that
the legislature "level up" poorer schools to equality with those in
wealthy districts, although this alternative would certainly involve
an increase in taxes. On the whole, however, there is little reason to
expect that invalidation of school financing schemes would provoke
substantial opposition. Lower court decisions that have invalidated
financing systems have been well received by the press and the public, 201 perhaps partially because of a growing dissatisfaction ·with the
property tax. 208 The restructuring of educational financing systems
would not be the emotional issue that school integration is.200 Preliminary responses suggest that the reform of educational financing
systems would not result in a division of opinion along ideological
Iines.210
In the event that political opposition does arise, however, the
Court would have various remedies available. Commentators have
suggested that the Court could excuse students from attendance,
order admission in other districts, award monetary compensation,
impound and redistribute flat funds, sequester the funds of rich
districts, use its contempt power, raise taxes, hire experts to plan a
new system, or shut down the school system entirely.211 It is not clear,
however, that the Court would welcome the resort to such harsh
204. See Kurland, supra note 3, at 592-93.
205. Id. at 595.
206. See id. at 591, 598-99.
207. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 8, at I, col. 6; Homogeneous Education, Wall St,
J., Dec. 30, 1971, at 6, col. I; A. Welcome Blow at the School Tax, FORTUNE, Oct. 1971,
at 68; A. Bad Way To Pay for Schools, LIFE, Dec. IO, 1971, at 42; Paying for Good
Schools, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. II, 1971, at 5-6.
208. See King, Taxes Bite Deeper, No Relief Foreseen, N.Y. Times, Jan. lll, 1972,
at I, col. 6; The Taxing Question, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1972, at 48 [hereinafter The

Taxing QuestionJ.
209. See PRlvATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 454.
210. See First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 118. In Michigan both the Democrats and
the Republicans have submitted plans for reforming the current educational financing
methods. Tschirhart, Does School Tax Violate Equal Rights1, Detroit News, Feb. 6, 1972,
§ B, at IO, col. 1 [hereinafter TschirhartJ.
211. PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supra note 8, at 448; Silard 8: White,
supra note 3, at 31.
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alternatives. If the Court anticipated outright resistance to its decrees,
it might prefer to avoid involvement in educational financing litigation altogether.
C. Propriety of a Judicial Solution
Assuming that educational financing systems are in need of reform, the question of who should initiate the reforms arises. In

Rodriguez, the Supreme Court must first consider whether it possesses the necessary expertise to resolve the far-reaching policy questions that are inherent in the issue of educational financing reform.
The educational financing litigation involves complex issues of both
educational and economic policy. As noted above, it is hardly a foregone conclusion that equalization of educational spending by school
districts would improve the quality of public education. What is
more disturbing, however, is the possibility that reform might
actually have a negative effect on the quality of public education.212
If taxpayers resist the tax increases, equalization might result in
leveling down the wealthier districts to a median level, which would
dilute the quality of the best schools without necessarily improving
the worst significantly.218 Another possibility is that suburbanites
might desert the public schools in favor of private schools if they
were convinced that their property tax dollars would be used to
improve poorer schools throughout the state rather than their own
public schools.214 Consequently, a substantial body of voters might
coalesce in an effort to defeat all tax increases aimed at improving
the quality of public education.215 In addition to these "political"
problems, questions would arise concerning the long-range effect of
abandoning the current financing system on the functioning of local
government, suburban growth, relocation of industry, centralization
of government, increases in the use of sales and income taxes, and
exclusionary zoning.216
In terms of expertise, the Court is not the best-qualified institution to analyze these complex issues. The judiciary is quite often a
212. See First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 114.
213. Kurland, supra note 3, at 590-91.
214. But see PRlvATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 275.
215. Kurland, supra note 3, at 59. But see PRIVATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION,
supra note 3, at 278.
216. Andrews, supra note 117. For the argument that any adjustment of educational
financing methods would necessarily have a significant effect upon the state tax
structure as a whole, as well as the financing of all other municipal services, see
Dimond, supra note 3, at 136. See also PRlvATE WEALTH AND Ptmuc EDUCATION, supra
note 3, at 280-83. See generally Schoettle, supra note 3, at 388-93 (the Court is not qualified to grant specific remedies in areas where the public budget is involved since it is not
competent to make the necessary value judgments concerning what goals the state
should pursue and what mixture of spending will best promote the achievement of
these goals).
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forum for effective advocacy rather than careful analysis. The Court
does not have the fact-finding resources of the legislature, nor does it
have the experience in considering questions of educational and
economic policy that the legislature has. Finally, the Court does not
have the time that the legislature has to devote to extended analysis
of the issues.217 Resolution of the educational financing issue will
inevitably involve value judgments of great significance with respect
to social, educational, and economic policy. These judgments should
be made by a branch of government that is directly representative of
the people.218
Of course, .the details of new school financing plans would be
worked out by the legislatures. Nevertheless, by initiating the reforms and setting the basic ground rules, the Court would set in
motion a process whose impact on the future of public education and
society as a whole would be immense and uncertain. The Court
could hardly disavow the consequences of "reforms" that it has initiated. Yet should the reforms tum sour, the Court could not be held
politically accountable. Furthermore, if the Court's ideas of equality
of educational financing should prove unworkable or counterproductive, the constitutional basis of the reforms would make a change
of direction difficult. Thus, the educational financing litigation may
be the type of case in which the Court should exercise judicial restraint.
The Court has, however, occasionally undertaken to resolve
problems involving major policy issues that might more appropriately
have been dealt with by another branch of government. The integration and reapportionment decisions are the two most striking
examples. The Court's decisions to intervene in these areas were
motivated by necessity. In both instances, legislatures arguably
should have initiated reform, but it was clear that legislative reform
was politically hazardous and thus unlikely. Given the political composition of many of the state legislatures and the United States Congress, it was quite apparent that desegregation could not be initiated
through the normal political channels.219 In addition, the Court's
intervention may have been necessitated by the fact that Plessey v.
Ferguson 220 was still available as authority for segregationist legislation. Likewise, malapportioned legislatures were unwilling to re217. Kurland, supra note 3, at 600; Schoettle, supra note 8, at 1396. The district
court in Burrus v. Wilkerson acknowledged the difficulty that the financing cases
presented when it commented that "the courts have neither the knowledge, nor the
means, nor the power to tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these
students throughout the state." 810 F. Supp. at 574.
218. See Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1398-99.
219. Cox, supra note 111, at 122.
220. 168 U.S. 537 (1896).
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apportion themselves in the absence of external pressure since it was
to the political advantage of the parties that controlled the legislatures to resist reapportionment.221 Once the Court concluded that
reforms were of extraordinary importance, that the issues were judicially cognizable, and that there was no hope of resolution through
normal political channels, its intervention became imperative.
The Court will probably evaluate the possibilities of educational
financing reform by normal political processes. The inequalities
created by educational financing systems have existed for quite some
time without major legislative reform. This legislative inertia might
suggest that there is little hope for change through ordinary political
channels.222 However, it has only been ·within the past decade that
some of the most serious inequities of the financing systems have been
recognized,228 and much of the influential ·writing on the subject has
been done quite recently.224 Only within the past year have the inequalities of educational financing become an issue of general public
concern, and there is always lag time between initial expressions of
public solicitude and legislative response.
Currently, the time for substantial legislative reform of educational financing systems is ripe. Popular support for court decisions
overturning state financing systems has been encouraging to reformers. The response from the media has been almost entirely favorable,
and no significant opposition groups have coalesced. Furthermore,
dissatisfaction with the local property tax at the same time that educational financing reform is in its incipiency might well be one of
those accidents of history that gives rise to significant change in the
status quo. Since half of the school districts are by definition below
the state median of taxable wealth and since the vast majority of
districts have far less taxable property than the richest districts, it
would seem that a substantial percentage of the state's citizens would
benefit from a more equitable system of educational financing. 2211
Given the current concern for education, when full information
221. Cox, supra note 111, at 122. Undoubtedly other factors prompted judicial
intervention in these cases. In the desegregation litigation, it was significant that the
primary purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to ensure equality to the Negro.
In the reapportionment cases the fact that reforms promised to improve the operation•
of representative government probably affected the Court's decision to intervene.
222. l'RlvATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 292-93.
223. Id. at 46, 65.
224. E.g., C. B!!NSON, THE CHEE:RFUL PROSPEcr: A STATEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF
PUBUC EDUCATION (1965); A. WISE, supra note 3; PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBUC EDUCATION,
supra note 3; J. THOMAS, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MICHIGAN
(1968).
· 1·1 : "fl~ 1$1~
225. First Appraisal, supra note 3, at 118. It has also been suggested that owners
of commercial and industrial property in the poorer districts might support legislative
reform since it might result in a lowering of their tax rates. Id.
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about the substantial disparities among districts in educational resources gains currency, the public probably will support reform. 226
Significant reform efforts have already been initiated at both the
state and national levels. In New York, a commission appointed by
the governor recently culminated a two-year study by issuing an extensive report on the need for reforming the State's educational
financing system.227 The commission urged that the State assume the
task of raising and distributing funds for public education through
a uniform state-wide property tax. 228 The report proposed that the
expenditures of wealthier districts be frozen at current levels and
that poorer districts be raised to parity with these levels over a fiveyear period.229 The commission report received immediate support
from state legislative leaders, although the complexity and the longrange implications of the problem may delay reform for up to five
years until the legislature has studied the issue and possible alternative solutions.230 If the efforts of New York are emulated throughout
the nation, substantial judicial action may prove unnecessary.
Michigan is another state in which the legislative process is reacting to public concern over the inequities in educational financing.
While suits challenging the Michigan system of educational financing
are pending,231 both the Republicans and the Democrats have proposed plans for restructuring the system and are conducting petition
campaigns to include their respective plans on the November ballot
as proposed constitutional amendments. 282 The Republican proposal
would abolish the property tax as a method of school financing and
replace it 1\Tith an increase in the personal income tax and a valueadded sales tax.233 The revenue collected would be distributed to
local districts in order to retain some form of local control. The
Democratic proposal would replace the local property tax with a
graduated income tax.284 Regardless of whether the Michigan supreme court declares the current financing system unconstitutional,
the State is well along the road toward significant reform.
In addition, federal legislative reform is currently being consid226. A recent poll (California Poll 3281, 1967, cited by Kirp &: Yudof, supra note 8,
at 147 n.8) determined that 83% of the citizens of California "felt that poor districts
should receive as much money per pupil as rich districts."
227. N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
228. Id.
229. Id. at I, cot 8; at 84, col. 1.
230. Id. at 34, cols. 3-4.
231. Milliken v. Green, Civil No. 1!!664-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County, Mich., filed
Oct. 16, 1971); Montgomery v. Milliken, Civil No. 13719-C (Cir. Ct. Ingham County,
Mich., filed Oct. 27, 1971).
232. Tschirhart, supra note 210, at 10, col. 1.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 10, col. 3.
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ered. A special commission recently completed a two-year study of
educational financing and presented the President with its report.235
The commission recommended that the state governments assume
the major burden of financing public education.236 It proposed that
the federal government offer the states between 4.5 and 7.5 billion
dollars over the next five years as an incentive to reform.237 These
proposals are currently being studied by the executive branch, and,
notably, President Nixon referred to the problem of educational
financing in his state of the Union message. Thus, in the future the
federal government may play a larger role in supporting public education.238 In addition, the President has recently signed a bill which
·will provide substantial aid to education.289 In particular, the Act
~rill provide 2 billion dollars in federal funds to grade schools and
high schools in districts that are currently involved in desegregation. 240 While this will not alleviate the massive inequalities caused
by current educational financing methods, it suggests that in the
future the federal government may be willing to assume a substantial share of the cost of ensuring equal educational opportunity. It
has also been announced that the President intends to propose
legislation that would call for a nationwide value-added sales tax,241
the proceeds of which would be recycled to the states to help support
public education.242 In exchange for federal funds, the states would
agree to repeal some of their current property taxes or extend income
tax credits to families that pay such taxes. 243 Senator McGovern has
also submitted a proposal that the federal government pay one third
of the current costs of educational financing. 244 Clearly, there is a
·significant chance for major legislative reforms at the national as
well as the state level in the not too distant future. 245 Thus, there
appears to be no immediate necessity for judicial action on the educational financing problem. Given the complexity of the problem, uncertainty about the efficacy of proposed solutions, and the potentiality
of legislative reform, the Supreme Court should probably refrain
from intervening in the educational financing controversy at this
time.
235. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. The Taxing Question, supra note 208, at 48.
239. Pub. L 92-318, 92d Cong., S. 659, June 2!1, 1972, reprinted in 41 U.S.L.W. 1
(Stat. July 18, 1972).
240. Id.
241. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.

242. Id.
243. Id. at 1, col. l; 22, cot 2.
244. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
245. But see Kirp 8: Yudof, supra note 3, at 146.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court may have been attempting to exercise judicial restraint when it summarily affirmed the judgments in Mclnnis
and Burrus. Conceivably, these cases are best interpreted as delaying
actions designed to channel the issues of educational financing out
of the courts and into the legislatures.246 The reformers continued
to litigate, however, and three years after Mclnnis the constitutional
challenge to educational financing systems has returned to the Supreme Court.
The Court is now under pressure to decide the educational financing case on the merits. Since the reform movement has been pursued
in the judicial context, the media and the public are focusing on the
Court for a definitive resolution of the question. 247 The status of
Mclnnis and Burrus as controlling precedents has been drawn into
question and can only be clarified by the Supreme Court. The Court
may feel constrained to supply guidance to courts that are hearing
school financing cases, especially since some courts that have already
decided such cases have apparently ignored the implications of recent
Supreme Court opinions by applying the strict equal protection
standard to school financing legislation. Finally, the basic posture
of the present litigation almost demands a decision on the merits.
After Mclnnis the Supreme Court could avoid directly confronting
the issue of the constitutionality of school financing systems by simply
summarily affirming judgments, especially since Mclnnis rested partially on nonjusticiability. Now, however, if the Supreme Court
summarily affirms the judgment of Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District, the educational financing case currently on
the Court's docket, it will implicitly approve the Serrano doctrine,
on which Rodriguez relied. If the Court disapproves of Serrano, it
will be forced to confront the school financing issue on the merits.
These factors push the Court toward a full review of Rodriguez.
There are a number of different ways that the Court could deal
with Rodriguez. It could affirm the decision and adopt the strict
-standard of review rationale that has prevailed in the lower courts.
Such a decision would be one of the most potentially expansive equal
protection decisions of the past decade, and the Court appears to be
concerned with restricting the application of the strict standard of
review to its current perimeters. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
the Court will follow Serrano and abandon the restrictive approach
that it established in Dandridge, Valtierra, and Lindsey.
The Court may choose to review the Texas school financing
scheme under the rational basis test. How strictly the Court will
246. Schoettle, supra note 3, at 1378.
247. See Andrews, supra note 117; Stevens, supra note 8.
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apply the rational basis test is uncertain, and thus the validity of the
financing system in Rodriguez is a close question under this standard.
If the Court is convinced that there is no rational basis for the current
financing systems, that there are manageable and relevant judicial
standards, that the Court has sufficient expertise to adequately resolve
the issues, and that there is no reason to defer to the legislature, the
Court may hold that the Texas school financing system violates the
equal protection clause under the traditional standard of review.
If the Court does not feel disposed to affirm Rodriguez, it need
not reverse immediately. It is generally agreed that existing educational financing systems are in need of reform. Even if the Court
does not wish to initiate reforms itself, it may be reluctant to reach a
decision that would discourage reform efforts of other branches of
government. The media and the public would read a reversal of
Rodriguez by the Supreme Court as a legitimization of the current
inequitable financing systems,248 although the Court's decision would
stand only for the conclusion that current systems simply do not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution or that reforms can more adequately be enacted by legislative bodies. Thus,
reversal of Rodriguez would doubtlessly have an adverse effect on the
progress of school financing reform in the legislatures.
Professor Kalven recently commented in regard to the current
constitutional challenges of the death penalty that "[t]his may be an
instance in which the very existence of constitutional litigation will
prove more significant than its outcome, underscoring the importance
for the dynamics of American political life of the forum provided by
the Court."249 To a lesser degree the same result might conceivably
occur in the area of educational financing as well: the public may
demand reform despite a Supreme Court reversal of Rodriguez. In
such a case, the courts would have served as a public forum by
focusing attention on an important social problem and thereby
forcing the legislature to perform its function.
Given the uncertain effects of an adverse decision on the cause
of reform, however, the Court may not wish to reverse Rodriguez.
The Court may indeed have on its docket a case of extreme national
importance that it is unwilling to affirm or reverse. In such an event,
the Court could postpone a decision, for as long as two or three years,
by scheduling and rescheduling the case for hearing until it feels a
decision is appropriate.250 This would allow Congress as well as
248. Cf. Cox, supra note 111, at 97-98.
249. Xalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at War, 85 HARv. L. R.Ev. 3, 21
(1971).
250. For instance, Brown v. Board of Education initially reached the Cc;mrt's
docket and was argued in October Term, 1952. It was reargued twice and the
decisions were finally handed down in 1954 and 1955.
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state legislatures time to develop measures for reforming educational
financing. Delay would not provide much immediate guidance for
the courts around the nation that are currently entertaining litigation challenging educational financing systems. However, the Court
might be willing to sacrifice this consideration temporarily in the
hope that the financing issue would be equitably resolved by means
other than judicial intervention.
The difficulty with postponement is that legislatures may defer
reform until the Court acts while the Court is waiting for legislatures to go fonvard. In the event of such a stalemate, the Court
should take the initiative and invalidate the Texas financing system
on equal protection grounds. But at this point in time, it is simply
too early to determine whether judicial action is necessary.201
The reform of educational financing systems is an idea whose
time has arrived. Within the next decade meaningful reform is
inevitable. The constitutionality of current financing systems is now
before the Supreme Court in Rodriguez. The Serrano rationale may
not provide the vehicle for equalizing educational .financing throughout the nation considering the Court's recent trend toward restraint
under the equal protection clause. Nor is it clear that immediate
judicial action would be in the best interests of reform given the
complexity of the problem and the potential for significant legislative and executive initiatives. Nevertheless, the judicial branch
has played and will doubtlessly continue to play an important role
in educational financing reform. Ultimately, this reform movement
may be a model of constructive interaction between the various
branches and levels of government in an effort to provide equal
protection of the laws.
251. Kurland, supra note 3, at 600.

